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Abstract: 
This paper explores the competing concepts of ‘standards as barriers’ and standards as catalysts’ in 
the context of food safety standards in international trade in agricultural and food products.  It is 
suggested that food safety standards can act as both a barrier to trade and the basis of competitive 
positioning for developing countries in international markets.  This suggests that the application of a 
strategic framework to analyze and assess alternative responses to evolving food safety standards can 
throw some light on the circumstances under which standards act to prohibit trade or, alternatively, 
create competitive trade opportunities.  The use of such a framework is illustrated through a brief 
case study of fish and fishery product exports from Kenya and India. 
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A Strategic Perspective on the Impact of Food Safety Standards on Developing Countries 
 
1. Introduction: 
In recent years, food safety standards have become a more prominent issue for global trade in 
agricultural and food products (Jaffee and Henson, 2004a; 2004b; Josling  et al., 2004).  The 
expansion of international trade in high-value agricultural and food products in particular has served 
to highlight the extent to which national food safety standards diverge, as well as the differential 
capacities of both public authorities and private sector suppliers to comply.  For many high-value 
agricultural and food products, international competitiveness is no longer driven by price and quality 
grades (Jaffee and Henson, 2004a; 2004b).  Rather, quality and safety concerns have come to the 
fore and the dominant modes of competition in many agricultural and food markets are based 
around quality rather than price (Busch and Bain, 2004).  There is greater scrutiny of the production 
or processing techniques employed along the associated supply chains (Buzby, 2003; Unnevehr, 
2003) and a number of meta systems, for example hazard analysis and critical control point 
(HACCP) and good agricultural practice (GAP), have increasingly become global food safety norms.  
Increasingly, such meta systems have been codified in a growing array of public and private food 
safety standards, the latter of which have become increasingly de facto mandatory in markets for high-
value agricultural and food products (Henson and Reardon, 2005; Henson, 2006). 
 
Of particular concern is the potential impact of food safety standards, whether promulgated by 
governments and/or private sector buyers, on the ability of developing countries to gain and/or 
maintain access to markets for high-value agricultural and food products, especially in industrialized 
countries.  Concerns are greatest in the case of low-income countries, given their typically weaker 
food safety and quality management capacities that can thwart efforts towards export-led agricultural 
diversification and rural development (World Bank, 2005).  However, while recognizing that food   2 
safety standards can act to impede exports, there is a need to ‘rebalance’ the current debate in this 
area.  Indeed, there is growing evidence that the proliferation and increased stringency of food safety 
standards is creating a new landscape that might form the basis for competitive repositioning and 
enhanced export performance of developing countries.  This paper explores the strategic role that 
food safety standards can play in export markets for high-value agricultural and food products, 
highlighting the basis for related competitive repositioning and relations to the manner in which 
developing country governments and/or private sector suppliers respond to evolving standards. 
 
2. Alternative perspectives on the trade effects of food safety and quality standards:  
The proliferation and enhanced stringency of food safety standards has caused considerable concern 
among low and middle-income countries and development agencies aiming to promote trade as a 
means to agricultural and rural development (see for example Henson et al., 2000; Unnevehr, 2000; 
Wilson and Abiola, 2003; Otsuki et al., 2001a).  While the WTO’s Agreement on Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures sets out broad ground rules for the legitimate application of public food 
safety measures, many of which have the potential to affect international trade, it is recognized that 
there remains considerable scope for national food safety controls to impede trade (Henson and 
Wilson, 2005; Roberts, 2004).  Indeed, there is an increasingly widespread presumption that public 
food safety standards are routinely used as a protectionist tool, providing ‘scientific’ justifications for 
prohibiting imports of agricultural and food products, or discriminating against imports by applying 
higher and/or more rigorous regulatory enforced standards than on domestic suppliers.  At the same 
time, private  food safety standards, that fall outside of the WTO, have come to play a more 
prominent role in governing agricultural and food markets (Henson and Reardon, 2005; Henson, 
2006).  Even where standards are not intentionally used to discriminate against imports, there is 
concern that their growing complexity and the lack of harmonization between countries impedes the   3 
efforts of  developing  countries to gain access to potentially lucrative markets in industrialized 
countries. 
 
In circumstances where regulators have wide discretion and various forms of differentiation are 
required for cost-effective management of food safety, there is undoubtedly scope for ‘mischief’.  
However, in practice separating legitimate differentiation from non-legitimate discrimination is 
problematic and, we would argue, may be of limited utility.  It is even more difficult to attribute 
particular food safety standards to protectionist designs, considering that in most circumstances 
where protectionism is alleged, there are at least partially legitimate food safety concerns at play.  
The case of the European Union’s (EU) standards for aflatoxins in nuts and cereals provides a 
poignant and widely publicized example (see for example Otsuki et al., 2001a; 2001b).  In other 
cases, trading partners have differing perspectives on the current state of scientific knowledge 
and/or the need to make allowance for uncertainty.  Perhaps the most prominent case is the dispute 
between the EU and United States (US) over restrictions on exports of beef produced with the use 
of hormones (Paulwelyn, 1999; Bureau et al., 1998). 
 
More broadly, there is concern that many developing countries lack the administrative, technical and 
scientific capacities to comply with dynamic and increasingly strict food safety standards, presenting 
potentially insurmountable barriers to the development of market opportunities, especially for high-
value agricultural and food products  (Henson  et al., 2000; Jaffee and Henson, 2004a; 2004b).  
Further, the associated  non-recurring  and/or recurring costs of compliance can undermine the 
longer-term competitive position of exporters, diminish the profitability of high-value agricultural 
and food exports and compete for scarce resources that might be used to address other more 
pressing social issues.  It is argued that the combined effects of these institutional weaknesses and   4 
costs of compliance contributes to the further marginalization of smaller and/or poorer countries 
(Wilson and Abiola, 2003), regardless of whether predominant food safety standards are driven by 
the public or private sectors. 
 
An alternative and less pessimistic view, however, emphasizes the potential opportunities provided 
by evolving food safety standards and the likelihood that certain developing countries can utilize 
such opportunities to their competitive advantage (Jaffee and Henson, 2004a; 2004b; World Bank, 
2005).  From this perspective, public and private standards are viewed, at least in part, as a necessary 
bridge between increasingly demanding consumer requirements and the participation of 
international suppliers.  Indeed, food safety standards may provide a ‘common language’ through 
increasingly global supply chains in a manner that diminishes  reducing transaction costs,  while 
promoting  consumer confidence in f ood product safety, without which  the market for these 
products cannot be maintained and/or enhanced.  This perspective sees public and private standards 
as ‘catalysts’ for the development and exploitation of competitive gains within markets for 
agricultural and food products where modes of competition are fundamentally based on quality 
rather than price. 
 
The costs of complying with food safety standards may also provide a powerful incentive for the 
modernization of export supply chains in low and middle-income countries.  Compliance with 
stricter food safety standards can also stimulate capacity-building within the public sector and give 
greater clarity to the appropriate management functions of government.  Further, through increased 
attention to the spread and adoption of ‘good practices’ in the supply of agricultural and food 
products there may be spillovers into domestic food safety systems, to the benefit of the local 
population and domestic producers.  Thus, the associated costs of compliance can be offset, at least   5 
in part, by an array of foreseen or unforeseen benefits from the induced enhancement of food safety 
management capacity.  Rather than  degrading the  competitiveness of  low and middle-income 
countries,  therefore,  the  enhancement of capacity t o meet stricter  food safety  standards c an 
potentially create new forms of competitive advantage.  While there will inevitably be losers as well 
as gainers, this view suggests that the process of standards compliance can conceivably provide the 
basis for more sustainable and profitable agricultural and food exports in the long-term.  In turn, it 
redirects the debate to identifying the conditions under which developing countries might be able to 
derive gains from evolving food safety standards, or at least minimize any losses. 
 
This rather crude dichotomy between ‘standards as barriers’ and ‘standards as catalysts’ suggests a 
complex reality in which close attention is needed to the specifics of particular markets, products 
and countries to understand how  specific  food safety standards  are providing challenges and 
opportunities for developing countries.  Further, there is a need to understand the strategic options 
and patterns of performance of developing countries in meeting these challenges and their ability to 
exploit emerging opportunities.  Such options should be examined at both the country and broad 
policy level, which is perhaps the predominant focus of government, and at the level of industries 
and individual exporters.  Thus, it needs to be acknowledged that both public and private sector 
entities have strategic options and choices,  albeit constrained by prevailing resources and 
institutional and market structures, while the export performance of a particular country for high-
value agricultural and food products will reflect the combined outcomes of these choices. 
 
3. Food safety standards as a strategic issue: 
The complexity of the food safety standards  environment  highlighted above  poses enormous 
challenges for  developing  countries  in general,  and stakeholders involved in export-oriented   6 
agricultural and food supply chains in particular.  Embedded within these challenges, however, are a 
plethora of strategic decisions that policy-makers and private sector exporters need to make in 
identifying the emerging set of requirements with which they must comply and the associated threats 
or opportunities.  In so doing, they must trade-off the available options through which compliance 
can be achieved and manage the chosen processes of capacity-building and adjustment.  The notion 
of ‘strategic options’ is novel in the context of food safety standards and trade, especially when 
considering developing countries.  The more typical assumption is that middle and (in particular 
low-income countries are ‘standards takers’, facing essentially ‘all-or-nothing’ decisions regarding 
compliance with few, if any, alternative approaches to achieving their trade goals.  The perspective 
presented here, however,  focuses instead on  the ‘room for  maneuver’  available to  developing 
countries in complying with food safety standards. 
 
Figure 1 presents a simple conceptual framework that aims to characterize alternative strategic 
responses to food safety standards.  This framework draws on the concepts of ‘exit’, ‘loyalty’ and 
‘voice’ developed by Hirschman (1970).  Hirschman’s framework was originally used to examine 
economic and political behavior as responses to the decline of firms, organizations and states, but 
has since been extended to quite different contexts, for example microfinance for micro and small 
enterprises (Lepenies, 2004).  Depending upon the context,  ‘exit’ could involve leaving an 
organization, emigrating, or ceasing to buy a company’s products.  ‘Voice’ involves protest or 
otherwise  lobbying for changes in rules and laws.  For Hirschman,  ‘loyalty’ relates to deepening 
one’s participation in, and alignment with, an entity’s goals and processes.  A second ‘proactivity’-
‘reactivity’ dimension relates to the time when efforts to comply commence, which is our own 
innovation. 
   7 
The predominant dialogue on food safety standards, especially relating to developing countries, 
presents a single strategic option of complying with public and private food safety standards in focal 
markets; this is Hirschman’s ‘loyalty’.  This can take a variety of forms, including the adoption of 
legal/regulatory reforms, changes in production technologies, shifts in the structure of supply 
chains, additional measures for conformity assessment, etc.  This approach to compliance can be 
implemented at the time a standard comes into force, that is ‘reactively’, or ahead of time in view of 
expectations as to how standards are likely to evolve in the future, that is ‘proactively’.  Everything 
else being equal, a ‘proactive’ approach affords greater potential to manage compliance in a manner 
that brings about strategic gain and minimizes any detrimental economic and social spillovers.  This 
relates to the existence of ‘first mover’ advantage, for example through earlier sunk costs or 
reputational effects, as well as to the greater flexibility afforded by longer time periods over which 
compliance can be pursued.  In a ‘pro-active’ mode, there is greater scope to test and apply 
alternative technologies and employ varied administrative and institutional arrangements. 
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
In practice, however, there are other strategic options beyond the strict compliance associated with 
‘loyalty’.  On the one hand, countries or individual private sector exporters can ‘exit’, choosing not 
to comply with the  food safety  standards being imposed in a particular market.  This implies 
switching customers, in the case of a private standard, or  exiting  particular export markets 
altogether, in the case of a public standard.  The producer and/or exporter may choose to switch to 
different products for which food safety standards are less problematic or costly given prevailing 
capacity; for example, shifting from a highly processed product (for example cereal products) to a 
more basic commodity ( for example  basic grains).  Such a strategy might be employed where   8 
compliance will yield a fundamental loss of competitiveness and/or negative economic and social 
impacts, where resources might be better spent elsewhere, and/or where profitable alternative 
markets exist that have less demanding  standards, for example the higher quality segments of 
domestic markets or in other developing countries.  Thus, ‘exit’ should not be construed as a loser’s 
strategy; it can take the form of a carefully considered re-direction of commercial strategy if pursued 
purposefully 
 
In parallel with strategies of ‘loyalty’ or ‘exit’, developing country governments and/or exporters can 
adopt a strategy of ‘voice’, seeking to influence the prevailing rules or responding to new standards 
by negotiating, or simply complaining.  For example, WTO members may raise their complaints 
through cross-notifications in the SPS Committee (Roberts, 2004) or engage in bilateral negotiations 
with their trading partners regarding the specific actions required to achieve compliance or the 
equivalence of differing national measures.  Individual exporters may question the  food safety 
standards being imposed by their customers and attempt to come to some compromise that reflects 
their prevailing local circumstances alongside customer’s demands.  Across both ‘exit’ and ‘voice’, 
being ‘proactive’ is considered more strategically advantageous than being ‘reactive’.  Typically in any 
one industry, a combination of all three types of strategies is likely to be observed, yet in differing 
proportions and perhaps involving different stakeholders, reflecting individual capacities, managerial 
objectives, risk perceptions and attitudes, etc. 
 
Besides the two dimensions in Figure 1, there are further ways to characterize the responses of 
developing countries to new food safety standards in export markets.  One distinction is between 
‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ approaches.  ‘Defensive’ strategies are aimed at maintaining the status quo 
and minimizing related impacts.  The aim is normally to limit the actions (and often also the   9 
investments) needed to achieve compliance.  This is often pursued under conditions of resource 
limitations and risk adversity.  ‘Offensive’ strategies involve attempts to utilize standards as a means 
to gain competitive advantage, even where this may require additional investments beyond the 
minimum required to achieve compliance. 
 
A final dimension relates to the locus of strategic response.  Measures can be taken within the public 
or private sectors, involving either individual entities (for example single exporters or producers) or 
various forms of collective action within or across the public and private sectors (Figure 2).  Where 
both the public and private sector are adopting measures, the leadership or driving force behind this 
process c an come from either side.  Traditionally, relatively clear distinctions  have been made 
between aspects of food safety management that are the domain of the public and private sectors.  
Increasingly, however, these demarcation lines are being challenged as co-regulatory approaches are 
employed and, more generally, there is a reliance on ‘soft law’ (Henson, 2006).  For example, the 
potential role of self-regulation through industry-level  ‘codes of practice’ and commercial 
laboratories for product certification is being acknowledged.  Further, there is recognition of the 
potential efficiencies associated with collective and collaborative actions.  These can include inter-
ministerial task forces seeking to avoid duplication of efforts where multiple tiers of government are 
involved and/or trade and industry associations that build on the compliance investments made by 
individual enterprises.  Collective action can also take place across the public and private sectors, for 
example through joint task-forces.  More broadly, it is recognized that both the public and private 
sectors have a role to play in responding to new food safety standards, and that national food safety 
management capacity should be viewed from this holistic perspective. 
 
FIGURE 2 HERE   10 
 
In the context of this framework, the most positive and potentially advantageous strategy  for 
developing countries, both as a whole and for exporters therein, combines ‘voice’, ‘proactivity’ and 
‘offensive’ orientations.  Everything else being equal, this approach is most likely to turn the 
challenges associated with new food safety standards into competitive opportunities and to yield 
positive social and economic spillovers.  Conversely, the most negative approach is a combination of 
‘exit’, ‘reactivity’ and ‘defense’.  Indeed, there may be considerable costs associated with such an 
approach, related to the level of sunk investments and the social and economic consequences for 
supply chains that are export-oriented.  Thus, the aim of capacity-building should  be seen as 
maximizing the strategic options for developing countries and, more particularly, enhancing the 
scope to implement strategies that are ‘offensive’, ‘proactive’ and involve negotiation. 
 
4. Strategic analysis of food safety standards and trade – an application: 
As described above, this strategic perspective can be applied to both public and private sector 
responses to evolving food safety standards for agricultural and food products in the context of 
international trade.  To explore how this framework might enhance our understanding of the 
impacts of food safety standards on developing country exports of high-value agricultural and food 
products, a series of case studies has been undertaken by the authors as part of a broader program of 
research coordinated by the World Bank (see for example World Bank, 2005; Jaffee, 2003; 2005; 
Henson and Mitullah, 2004; Henson, Saqib and Rajasenan, 2005).  To provide an illustration, 
drawing on e two of these case studies, Table 1 outlines the differing responses to evolving food 
safety standards (specifically related to hygiene and chemical residues) for fish and fishery products, 
predominantly in the EU, in Kenya and India (and specifically the state of Kerala).  Both countries 
at some time in the 1990s had restrictions applied on exports to the EU and, more generally, have   11 
faced demands for enhanced food safety controls through the supply chain.   The supply chains 
under scrutiny in both cases were generally operating below capacity, while the standards used in 
their processing facilities differed markedly.  All were facing growing competition and price pressure 
that challenged their established market position; Kenya for Nile perch, Kerala for shrimp. 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
The dominant response to the imposition of stricter food safety standards for fish and fishery 
products in Kenya and India has been reactive, loyal and defensive, both by the government and in 
the private sector.  Thus, hygiene and antibiotic controls have been upgraded largely in response to 
regulatory change in the EU and US, or on demand from major customers.  In Kenya, little action 
was taken until the European Commission undertook inspections which led to an on-going series of 
restrictions on  exports to the EU.    In Kerala, the Indian government had implemented  initial 
reforms of its regulatory framework in response to evolving EU legislation, yet these were 
insufficient to comply with the EU’s requirements.  In both cases the substantive drive to upgrade 
hygiene controls occurred suddenly when market access to the EU was threatened or curtailed. 
 
In both Kenya and Kerala, however, there were examples of exporters who adopted proactive and 
offensive strategies; these firms had seen the overall direction of food safety standards in their 
dominant export market and made substantive efforts to upgrade their controls to meet those 
standards ahead of their competitors.  While in most cases they represented a relatively small part of 
the total industry, they clearly stuck out as leaders.    At the same time, however, some 
processor/exporters exited the industry altogether in response to stricter controls, while others 
refocused their business on other markets with lower standards.    Standards-related pressures,   12 
however, were not the only factors stimulating market exit, other factors  included resource 
management constraints and broader competitive and capacity issues, compounding the problems of 
generating the investments required to comply with the new standards. 
 
These two case studies also illustrate some attempts to exert voice, although in a reactive and 
defensive mode in response to restrictions already imposed or threatened by the EU.  Both the 
government and industry were involved in such efforts, which clearly were designed to ‘fight fires’.  
Indeed, in the case of Kenya the perceived need to fight the restrictions imposed by the European 
Commission brought about the first real cooperation between firms in the fish processing sector and 
between the industry and government.  While ongoing negotiations may have taken place between 
individual exporters and their customers, these do not appear to have been a major element of the 
strategic response of most firms, reflecting perceptions of ‘powerlessness’ on the part of many. 
 
While Kenya and India differ significantly in size and income, their response to evolving food safety 
standards was broadly similar - loyalty, reactive, and defensive.  There was limited evidence of voice;, 
and where used it was generally in crisis mode as a response to impending or prevailing threats to 
exports.  However, some leading exporters had seen the drive toward higher standards and made 
advance efforts to comply as a means to gain competitive advantage.  Many of these leading firms 
gained significant market share as a result of their proactivity, while most of the laggards have had to 
leave the industry or redirect their exports to countries with lower standards, which also tend to be 
less profitable..  These observed changes in the structure and modus operandi of export supply chains, 
per se, are not attributable to the imposition of stricter food safety standards alone.  Rather, the 
challenges of compliance with these standards acted to exacerbate existing competitive pressures 
that, in turn, reflected prevailing market and economic conditions.   13 
 
5. Factors influencing strategic options and choices: 
The wider body of case studies undertaken by the authors has served to identify a series of factors 
that affect the viability of alternative standards-related strategies for government and private firms, 
including the ability to pursue more pro-active and offensive ‘voice’ and ‘compliance’ approaches.  
These factors are summarized in Table 2. 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
For individual exporters, enterprise size is a key variable in the ability to be proactive and offensive. 
There are typically significant economies of scale in compliance such that unit costs tend to be lower 
for larger enterprises (Jaffee and Henson, 2004a; 2004b).  For example, the introduction of HACCP 
in a processing facility and/or GAP on a farm involves ‘lumpy’ investments (for example 
construction or upgrading of buildings and equipment) that are not critically dependent on 
enterprise size.  Such economies of scale are likely to be less significant, however, for firms that are 
highly diversified by products and/or across markets with differing food safety standards.  Large 
enterprises also may have greater scope to negotiate on standards-related requirements - that is to 
exhibit voice - especially with respect to major customers, and may have easier or cheaper access to 
capital.  At the same time, however, the strategic options of all enterprises will be influenced by 
prevailing levels of managerial and technical capacity and overall organizational objectives.  The 
reputation of the firm, the level of value-added of its products and the degree to which products are 
branded are also critical factors influencing the viability of particular strategic responses. 
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The size and structure of an industry and the competitive environment in which it operates will also 
influence the strategic options that exporters face, in particular their ability to be proactive.  Salient 
factors include the overall output of the industry relative to installed capacity, levels of integration 
and coordination along supply chains, modes of competition and levels and forms of industry 
cooperation and integration.  For example, even industries with a large supply base of small and 
medium-sized enterprises may be able to exert voice if there is a well-established and effective 
industry or trade organization.  International market share and existence of alternative sources of 
supply are relevant as well; these, influence the ability of the standard-setter to go elsewhere should 
the industry choose to not comply.  The existence and/or effectiveness of industry leadership, 
whether on an individual or collective basis, is also critical in the process of achieving compliance; 
leading firms or farms can set an example, may be able to test newer technologies or organizational 
approaches at lower risk and/or unit cost and, more broadly, can push others to follow in order to 
enhance or maintain the international reputation of the entire industry.  
 
Strategic options in compliance will vary across countries reflecting economic, political and social 
systems and norms, institutional structures, geographical size, etc.  The efficacy of general legal 
frameworks, food safety control systems, and general governance are also important, for the ability 
to comply, to project voice and for the international receptiveness of a country’s compliance efforts.  
Indeed, there are predominant areas in which food safety control systems in developing countries 
tend to be deficient (World Bank, 2005).  These include weaknesses in legislative frameworks and 
non-compliance with international norms, limitations of surveillance and inspection systems and 
procedures, lack of laboratory testing capacity and inadequate controls within private sector supply 
chains.  Capacity and governance can also be a major constraint on pro-activity; it is difficult for a 
country and/or exporters to be first movers if they are struggling with basic capacity issues.  A   15 
country that is perceived to have weak capacity, perhaps because it lacks an appropriate legal and 
regulatory framework, clarity in institutional roles or lacks particular capabilities in the public or 
private sector, is unlikely to have much success in exercising voice, either on a multilateral or 
bilateral basis.  Further, such countries may struggle to achieve compliance, even after allocating 
significant levels of financial or human resources.  It might also be unrealistic to expect a country 
that is experiencing a disease outbreak, trade ban or other form of crisis to exercise effective voice, 
although as always there are exceptions. 
 
The strategic approach that is actually adopted in a particular circumstance will clearly differ over 
time, between countries and across issues, reflecting attitudes toward standards, levels of risk 
adversity, and other factors.  Indeed, in the short term many developing countries may lack the 
confidence to move away from their more traditional compliance-based strategies to being more 
proactive and/or offensive.   However, even in countries where prevailing levels of capacity are 
generally weak it is often possible to see examples of proactive and/or offensive responses to 
evolving food safety standards.  For example, well-managed companies and supply chains, together 
with reasonably effective industry organizations, can frequently compensate for weaknesses in public 
services.  This may involve undertaking certain functions on behalf of government or helping public 
agencies to implement their functions.  The horticultural product sector in a number of countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa provides a notable example of where private sector leaders have been extremely 
proactive and offensive in response to emerging food safety requirements (see for example Jaffee, 
2004). 
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6. Conclusions: 
This paper has put forward and examined the concept of ‘standards as catalysts’ in the context of 
food safety standards in international trade and the ’room for maneuver’ that developing countries 
may possess in the face of an ever-changing and increasingly complex standards environment.  This 
contrasts with the ‘standards as barriers’ perspective that has dominated the literature on food safety 
standards and agricultural and food trade.  In so doing, however, the aim has not been to deny that 
food safety standards can be serious impediments to agricultural and food exports from low and 
middle-income countries.  Rather, the dominant theme is the need for a strategic orientation when 
considering the trade effects of food safety standards in order to ascertain how and when these trade 
effects reflect the manner in which developing country governments and/or exporters respond to 
emerging standards and the scope for competitive gain out of changes in the standards landscape. 
 
This paper has presented evidence that is both limited in its scale and scope simply as a means of 
illustration.  However, it lays out the range of strategic approaches that might be employed by 
developing countries, both at the level of government and individual exporters.  These illustrate the 
ways in which strategic responses vary across countries and between exporters therein, reflecting 
prevailing capacities and perspectives on emerging standards.  Overall, these responses are typified 
by strategies that are ‘reactive’ and ‘defensive’.  At the same time, however, there are exporters that 
are ‘proactive’, complying ahead of their competitors and often deriving competitive advantage as a 
result.  Across these various scenarios there is evidence of ‘voice’, although it is not evident that this 
is a major  strategic response, while efforts in this regard are severely curtailed by capacity 
constraints. 
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An important implication of the strategic perspective presented above is the need for capacity-
building efforts related to food safety controls to be recast away from the conventional focus on 
problem-solving and coping strategies, often  centered on the development of technical 
infrastructure.  Instead, capacity-building should be geared towards maximizing the strategic options 
available to both government and the private sector in developing countries when faced with new or 
more stringent food safety standards and enhancing their ability to recognize and manage these 
options in a seemingly ever more dynamic standards environment.  It also emphasizes the dual roles 
of the public and private across multiple jurisdictions, and the interplay between these, in 
determining the impacts of evolving food safety standards on developing countries.  Capacity-
building efforts also need to reflect this, highlighting the need to move away from a typical 
preoccupation with public sector capacity. 
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Figure 1. Strategic response to food safety standards: 
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Figure 2. Actors in strategic response to standards: 
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Table 1. Analysis of Strategic Response to Evolving Food Safety Standards for Fish and 
Fishery Products in Kenya and India: 
  Reactive  Proactive 
India 
(State of Kerala) 
Exit 
 
Some processors have ceased production since imposition of 
higher hygiene standards 
Little or no evidence of strategies in this field 
Loyalty  Substantive efforts to comply with hygiene requirements 
occurred after inspection mission by European Commission 
Some initial attempts to reform regulatory 
controls prior to European Commission 
inspections 
Some processors had seen drive toward 
higher hygiene standards and built/upgraded 
their plants (offensive). 
Voice 
 
Complaints to European Commission and member states 
over border detentions caused by antibiotic residues/bacterial 
inhibitors 




Some processors have ceased production since imposition of 
higher hygiene standards 
Little or no evidence of strategies in this 
field 
Loyalty  Virtually all efforts to comply with hygiene requirements 
occurred after inspection mission by European Commission 
One or two exporters had made some 
attempts to upgrade their hygiene standards 
ahead of the industry as a whole 
Voice 
 
Joint government-industry mission to European Commission 
once restrictions imposed 
Collective action on the part of the industry to lobby 
government and the EU 
Little or no evidence of strategies in this 
field   25 
 
Table 2. Factors influencing availability and choice of strategic options: 
Factor  Exit  Voice  Loyalty 
Size of firm or industry  –  ++  + 
Share of target market (segment)  –  ++  + 
Reputation for quality/safety  +  ++  + 
Suitability of legal/regulatory framework    ++  + 
Leadership/coordination within private sector    +  ++ 
Private sector management/technical capacity  +  +  ++ 
Clarity of institutional responsibilities/procedures    +  + 
Geographic/agro-climatic factors  –/+    –/+ 
Circumstances (for example, a “crisis”)  ++  –  –/+ 
 